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1. Introduction 
 
The number of part-time jobs has increased slightly but continuously in most advanced economies 
over the last decades. The ratio over total employment of part-time workers in the OECD increased 
from 13.9% in 1988 to 17.1% in 2013. Driving this type of employment are demand factors, such 
as the increasing importance of the service sector and fixed costs per employee, but also supply 
factors, like increasing women’s labour participation (Euwals and Hogerbrugge, 2006; 
Montgomery, 1988). Furthermore, many governments have seen part-time jobs as a way of 
responding to economic crisis and have propelled their growth, given that they offer greater 
flexibility to firms in the use of their labour force while at the same time facilitating job creation. 
Part-time employment is usually considered as a component of the secondary labour 
market that grants flexibility to firms while providing opportunities for workers with low 
qualifications or less closely linked to employment. However, the international literature 
concludes that part-time workers suffer a wage penalty that differs across countries, probably 
owing to differences in the wage determination process and the characteristics of collective 
bargaining. In fact, in countries with lower coverage of the collective bargaining, the wage penalty 
is usually higher. The part-time wage penalty is defined as that proportion of the raw gap between 
the hourly wage of full-time and part-time employees that is not explained by other factors such 
as worker, job, firm or regional characteristics. 
Figure 1 shows a clear relationship between the wage penalty found by different studies 
(summarised below) and the coverage of collective bargaining in the considered countries. Taking 
this into account, the objective of this paper is two-fold: first, to analyse the existence (or not) of 
a wage penalty for part-time workers in the Spanish labour market; second, to check if there are 
differences in the penalty between Spanish regions. According to the previous exposition, our 
hypothesis is that, due to the high coverage of the collective bargaining, the wage penalty for part-
time workers would be reduced and, moreover, if the size of this penalty is mainly driven by 
differences in labour market institutions related to collective wage bargaining, relevant regional 
differences would not be observed. 
We begin by comparing changes in the incidence of part-time employment in Spain and 
Europe, and by providing analysis of the Spanish regulatory framework and regional diversity, 
establishing the rationale for the investigation. A review of the relevant literature then provides 
the conceptual tools used to analyse the contribution to the size of the part-time wage penalty of 
collective bargaining coverage, relative to other factors. The fourth section presents the database 
and the econometric methodology. The fifth section outlines the findings, and the last section 
summarises the conclusions of the analysis. 
Context and rationale 
In Spain, although the incidence of part-time employment has traditionally been low (it increased 
from 4.2% in 1987 to 6.8% in 1995), it accelerated over more recent decades (10.8% in 2007 and 
15.7% in 2015), propelled by a legal change approved in late 2013 allowing more flexibility in 
the number of working hours (IMF[International Monetary Fund], 2015). The recent economic 
crisis has represented a significant loss of jobs in Spain. Between 2008 and 2014, more than three 
million jobs (15% of 2008 employment levels) were destroyed. However, during these years the 
number of part-time jobs increased by more than 350,000 people (a 14.7% increase over a six year 
period) (INE [Instituto Nacional de Estadística], 2016). 
From an international perspective, the share of part-time workers in Spain is still a 
moderate figure, lower than the averages for the OECD [Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development] (17.1%), the EU [European Union] (19.6%) and the Eurozone (21.5%) 
averages. The traditionally low presence of part-time jobs in Spain is probably explained because 
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its regulation has not been clear until very recently (Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2008; Fernández-
Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas, 2010), but also because Spanish firms have usually tended to 
achieve flexibility mainly through fixed-term contracts. On the other hand, it must be noted that a 
prominent characteristic of part-time employment in Spain is that, in contrast to most developed 
countries, it is mainly involuntary. Thus, according to Eurostat (2016a) figures for 2014, a 64% 
of total part-time work in Spain was involuntary (70% for men and 62% for women), whereas the 
averages for the OECD, the European Union and the Eurozone were 21% (23% for males and 
20% for females), 29% (40% for males and 26% for females), and 32% (42% for males and 29% 
for females) respectively. 
Even though largely involuntary, part-time employment in Spain is on the whole highly 
regulated. The Spanish labour market follows the so-called Mediterranean model (Sapir, 2005). 
Union density is relatively low (16%), but the coverage of collective agreements is very high, 
close to 80% (ILO — International Labour Office, 2015), as a result of the legal extension of 
collective agreements. Sectoral collective bargaining predominates, covering the 90% of 
employees covered by agreements, while firm level bargaining represents only 10%, although it 
has been clearly promoted by the 2012 labour reform. Regarding sectoral bargaining, although 
there are national sectoral collective agreements that apply throughout the Spanish territory, most 
sectoral agreements are negotiated at regional (NUTS [Nomenclature of Units for Territorial 
Statistics] 2 level) or, especially, provincial levels (NUTS 3). These agreements apply to all 
companies and workers in the sector and territory, so that the coverage of collective bargaining is 
in general very high in all Spanish regions. The minimum wage accounts for 36% of the average 
wage, Spain being one of the advanced countries with the lowest percentage together with the 
United States, Estonia and the Czech Republic. However, Spain is the European country with the 
lowest percentage (0.2%) of workers earning less than 105% of the minimum wage (Eurostat, 
2016b). 
Wage differentials in Spain have traditionally been small, as in most continental Europe 
countries, due to the high coverage of collective agreements. However, during the crisis, wage 
inequality in Spain increased due to the wage devaluation suffered by those workers who have 
had to change jobs during the last years, mostly temporary workers (Font et al., 2015). After 
Poland, Spain is the second European country with the largest presence of temporality (26% of 
employees) (Eurostat, 2016a). This high figure is usually explained by the characteristics of the 
Spanish productive structure, with a high specialisation in activities such as services and 
construction, and the high costs of firing permanent workers (Jaumotte, 2011). 
The employment rate of Spanish women is 50%, ten points below men and nine points 
below the employment rate for European women. However, women now represent 45% of the 
total Spanish employment. Female workers are predominant in several service activities (retail, 
hospitality, health and other services) and in two manufacturing sectors (clothing and the 
pharmaceutical industry) (INE, 2016). We will thus analyse wage penalisation for part-time 
workers in the Spanish labour market, distinguishing among men and women. 
Spain’s recent increasing trend in part-time employment, which will probably continue in 
the future, together with the mainly involuntary nature of this type of employment, clearly justifies 
interest in analysing the main characteristics of part-time jobs in Spain, including wages. Although 
economic theory gives reasons to expect a wage penalisation for part-time employees, and 
previous studies for other countries show that this is a stylised fact in the labour markets of other 
advanced countries, research on the Spanish case is rather scarce and inconclusive, which justifies 
interest in advancing knowledge of the consequences of part-time employment for wages in this 
economy. Moreover, owing to the high coverage of collective bargaining in Spain (close to 80%), 
we expect that the size of the wage penalty associated with part-time work will be relatively low. 
Next, we carry out a regional analysis of the wage penalty for part-time workers — as far 
as we know, a novel approach in the international literature. The Spanish case is especially 
attractive from this perspective, given that regional differences in the incidence of part-time 
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employment are rather important, and observed wage differences between part-time and full-time 
workers also exhibit a significant regional heterogeneity. In Spain, regional labour markets and 
regional economies have traditionally exhibited very important differences, including 
unemployment rates (López-Bazo et al., 2005; Bande et al., 2008) and demographic trends. For 
instance, while some regions concentrate most of the population, in others it is dispersed (Ayuda 
et al., 2010; Goerlich and Mas (2008). The regional capacity to attract foreign workers has also 
been unequal (González and Ortega, 2011), while internal migratory flows have remained subdued 
(Bentolila, 1997). As discussed by Cuadrado-Roura and Maroto (2016), clear specialisation 
patterns are present in Spanish regions. While some regions such as Madrid, the Basque Country, 
Navarre and Catalonia are specialised in manufacturing and market services, the rest of regions 
are mainly specialised in construction, non-commercial services and energy and primary services 
activities. These industries have higher sensitivity to business cycles and suffered more during the 
last recession. R&D activities and innovative capacities are also geographically concentrated in a 
few regions (Coronado and Acosta, 1997). The high level of decentralisation (according to the 
IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2010, the sub-national share in total government 
expenditure is 48% and regional authorities are responsible for active labour market policies) is 
another distinguishing feature of the Spanish political system that has to be taken into account in 
this context. 
All in all, the nature of the wage differentials observed between full-time and part-time 
workers, together with the structural differences between Spanish regions and their labour markets 
and the high coverage of wage bargaining, make the analysis particularly interesting. While high 
bargaining coverage suggests that differences in regional wage penalties will be reduced, the high 
level of regional heterogeneity casts some doubts about this prediction. Taking into account that 
there are no previous studies looking at the regional dimension in this context, our analysis tries 
to provide novel evidence regarding which forces predominate in the process of wage 
determination. Our empirical analysis for the Spanish economy relies on the use of an employer-
employee dataset, the Spanish Encuesta de Estructura Salarial (Survey of Earnings Structure; 
hereafter SES). The use of such matched employer/employee data is rare in most previous studies 
in the topic (some exceptions can be found in Mumford and Smith, 2008 and O’Dorchai et al., 
2007). Moreover, an econometric decomposition specifically adapted for use with this kind of data 
that allows controlling for the effect of unobserved firm heterogeneity on wages is employed. 
 
2. Literature review 
Part-time employment is usually seen as another component of the secondary labour market that 
grants flexibility while providing employment for persons with low qualifications or less closely 
linked to the labour market (students or young adults, women limited by familial responsibilities, 
advanced age adults or those approaching retirement, among others). The characteristics usually 
associated with part-time jobs include lower wages, high temporality and, in the case of certain 
countries or modalities of partial employment, fewer worker rights (such as paid holidays, 
remuneration for medical leave or firing costs). Part-time employees are presented as having: 
reduced access to social security benefits (Houseman and Matchiko, 1998); fewer labour progress 
opportunities (Tilly, 1990; Russo and Hassik, 2008); smaller pensions (Ginn and Arber, 1998; 
O'Connell and Gash, 2003); less labour stability (Muñoz Bustillo et. al., 2008; Fernández-Kranz 
et. al., 2014); and a lower unionisation rate (Belous, 1988). 
The issue that has garnered the most attention of researchers is the study of wage 
differences. The stylised facts of this international literature (Table A1) suggest that there is in 
general a negative wage difference (in terms of hourly wage) for part-time employees when 
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compared to full-time employees1 and that part of this raw wage gap is explained by differences 
between each group in worker characteristics, whether observable or unobservable. Moreover, the 
characteristics of the job and the firm contribute to explaining the wage differential significantly, 
given that many part-time workers are engaged in low-wage occupations, industries, and firms 
(Hirsch, 2005, among others). However, despite adding multiple explanatory factors, an 
unexplained part of the wage differential usually persists, which is considered the wage penalty 
associated with working part-time. This wage penalty could be null for young people accessing 
their first job (Russo and Hassik, 2008), while there is abundant evidence that the differential 
increases with age and especially with years worked in part-time positions (Wolf, 2014) and that 
wage increases over time are also lower for part-time workers (Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-
Planas, 2011). While abundant gender analyses agree that the wage penalty is usually greater for 
women than for men, studies making disaggregated estimations are scarce. Studies disaggregating 
by levels of qualification conclude that the wage penalty is greater for the most qualified workers, 
as they suffer more from the effects of occupational degradation (Connolly and Gregory, 2009). 
Empirical evidence differentiating by labour market segments finds that the wage penalty is almost 
entirely due to the concentration of part-time employment in the secondary labour market 
(O'Connell and Gash, 2003). On the other hand, studies with regional disaggregation have rarely 
been conducted. Only two previous studies examine a territorial level lower than the national level: 
Harris (1993) examines the issue for women in Northern Ireland, finding a penalty of 19%, and 
Wolf (2014) distinguishes between West and East Germany, obtaining similar results for both 
parts of the country. 
Studies for the Spanish economy are rather scarce and present very dissimilar results, so 
additional evidence is needed. A first generation of papers, working with the European 
Community Household Panel (ECHP) estimate positive wage premiums for both genders, whether 
controlling or not for self-selection with probits (Cebrián et al., 2000, Pissarides et al., 2005; 
Pagán, 2007). More recently, using data from the Continuous Sample of Working Histories 
(MCVL in Spanish), Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas (2011) obtain (for 25 to 45 year-old 
women only) a wage penalty of 11.4 points, controlling for occupations and adding firm fixed 
effects. In more recent work with the same database, Fernández-Kranz et al. (2014) estimate that 
part-time women aged 23 to 45 have wage penalties of -6.1 logarithmic points if they have 
indefinite contracts and of -9.0 points if the contract is temporary. 
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data 
This research is based on cross-section microdata from the most recent available wave of the SES, 
corresponding to 2010. The SES is a nationally representative survey on firms, covering 
employees at establishments of any size. It encompasses the bulk of the Spanish private sector, 
excluding only specific industries such as agriculture and domestic service. 
Because the survey design is based on a two-stage sampling of employees working in 
firms, one of its most important features is the inclusion of matched employer-employee 
microdata. Moreover, it provides information about each of the 17 Spanish regions in which 
surveyed establishments are located, allowing for regional analysis which is a central part of this 
research. 
                                                 
 
 
1 However, in countries like Australia and South Africa, a positive wage bonus for part-time workers is observed 
(Posel and Muller, 2007 and Booth and Wood, 2008).  
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The survey provides detailed information on wages and characteristics of workers, jobs 
and firms. Workers are classified as part-time or full-time according to the information provided 
by the firm. The wage concept used in this research is the gross hourly wage and in its calculation 
any payment by companies that has been incorporated. The analysis is carried out separately for 
men and women. The explanatory variables considered include characteristics of individuals and 
attributes of their jobs and firms. The former are controls relating to: the nationality of the 
individual (i.e. differentiating between Spaniards vs. non-Spaniards); the level of general 
education (primary, secondary, or tertiary education); and age. The characteristics of the job are: 
years of seniority in the current job (including its quadratic form); type of contract (indefinite or 
fixed-term); and occupation (unskilled, semi-skilled or skilled occupations), while attributes of 
the firms are: industries of activity (12 categories); size (four categories); type of collective 
agreement (firm, national sector, or sub-national sector agreements); and region of location of the 
firm. 
The SES has some advantages over other surveys also used in the analysis of wage 
differentials between part- and full-time workers for the Spanish case, such as the MCVL. 
Although the MCVL presents a larger size and contains highly reliable administrative registers 
and longitudinal information, the SES contains matched employer-employee data that provide rich 
information on different variables that are crucial in explaining wage differentials and do not suffer 
from severe measurement error in the MCVL (namely educational level and occupation). 
Moreover, unlike the MCVL, the SES contains uncensored wages without maximum and 
minimum limits, and includes information regarding the number of hours worked, permitting the 
use of hourly wages as dependent variable. 
Regarding potential limitations of the dataset, note that with the SES it is not possible to 
take into account in the empirical analysis the potential selection bias associated with the selection 
of working part- or full-time by individuals. The usual form to correct this problem, apart from 
being controversial, requires the use of valid exclusion restrictions that are not available in the 
SES. However, the fact that most part-time employment in Spain is involuntary reduces the scope 
of this limitation in the Spanish context. In any case, the potential impact in our results of not 
being able to control for selection bias cannot be easily assessed. In the light of the results obtained 
in the available studies, it is extremely difficult to assess the effect of not controlling for self-
selection. No clear pattern emerged from the literature review: in some papers, after controlling 
for self-selection, the wage penalty is reduced; in others, there is no effect or the penalty even 
increases. 
Observations with missing values on key variables and those for individuals aged less than 
16 years or over 65 years have been filtered. As most previous studies on the relative wage 
treatment of part-time workers limit the analysis to private sector employees, observations 
corresponding to the public sector have been removed. The final sample is formed by 152,099 
observations, 89,344 men and 62,755 women, and the regional samples range between 2,152 and 
28,382 employees. The descriptive statistics of the samples can be consulted in Table A.2. 
3.2. Methodology 
In the empirical analysis, we use an extension of the Juhn et al. (1993) decomposition, specifically 
adapted for use with matched employer-employee data. This technique departs from the estimation 
of the following semi-logarithmic wage equation: 
jijiij aεβXw   (1) 
wherein: wij is the natural log of hourly wage of individual i in workplace j; Xi is a vector of 
controls including individuals’ characteristics and those of their jobs and the firms employing 
them;  is a vector of parameters to be estimated (including an intercept); ij is a stochastic error 
term; and aj is an error component corresponding to workplace j and invariant for all individuals 
working in the same workplace. 
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Following the recommendation of Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) and Neumark (1998), as a 
first step of our decomposition analysis, equation (1) is estimated for the pool of workers (i.e., 
full- and part-time workers). Identification of workplace effects is guaranteed, given that there is 
more than one observation per workplace in the dataset. Since the result of Hausman’s contrast 
indicates that workplace-specific effects are correlated to the rest of the explanatory variables in 
equation (1), the model is estimated by fixed effects (which is equivalent to estimating by ordinary 
least squares with a set of workplace dummies). Relying on the properties of the ordinary least 
squares estimator, after the estimation of equation (1) with the pooled data, the average wage of 
the subgroup of workers s (s=full- or part-time workers) can be expressed as:  
ssss Xw   ˆ          where )1,0(~ ,   )1,0(~  (2) 
where: 
sw  stands for the mean natural log of the hourly wage of a given group s; 
sX  is a vector 
of the average of the set of explanatory variables for group s; ˆ  is the vector of coefficients 
estimated with equation (1) and the pooled data; σ is the estimated standard deviation of wage 
residuals of the pool of workers; 
s  is the average standardised residual of group s; η is the 
estimated standard deviation of workplace effects of the pool of full- and part-time workers; and 
s  is the average standardised workplace effect of group s. 
Using the pooled wage structure as the market price reference in the decomposition, the wage 
gap between part- and full-time workers can be written as follows:  
  ˆ)()(ˆ)( XXXww fpfpfpfp ----  (3) 
Where: the subscript p is for part-time workers and f is for full-time workers; and a  prefix 
denotes the average difference between both groups in the subsequent variable. 
In brief, equation (3) provides a decomposition of the part-time/full-time wage gap that quantifies 
the extent to which average wage differences between part-time and full-time workers are related 
to: (a) differences in observed characteristics )(
fp XX - , valued at market prices ( ˆ ); (b) the 
influence of unobserved elements measured as the impact of differences between part- and full-
time workers on the average standardised residual )(
fp  -  multiplied by the money value per unit 
difference in the standardised residual (σ ), which determines the specific wage penalty suffered 
by the disadvantaged group; and (c) the influence of workplace-related factors, namely the product 
of the difference in the average standardised workplace effect of part- and full-time workers 
)( fp  - , which measures the intensity of part-time workers’ segregation into low-wage 
workplaces, and the dispersion of wage differentials across workplaces (η), which determines the 
degree of the wage penalty for part-time workers resulting from this segregation. Note that the 
second term of the decomposition corresponds to an estimation of the average intra-firm wage 
differential in the Spanish economy between part- and full-time employees with the same observed 
characteristics and working in the same firm. 
 
4. Results 
Table 1 provides information on the wage differential between part- and full-time workers 
(measured as the logarithm of the wage per hour) and on the incidence of part-time work for Spain 
and the Spanish regions, distinguishing between male and female workers. A negative (positive) 
wage differential corresponds to a wage disadvantage (advantage) of part-time workers, whereas 
the incidence of part-time is measured on the total number of employees. This evidence shows 
that in Spain there is a significant negative average wage differential for part-time workers, with 
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a gap substantially lower in the case of men (-0.104 logarithmic points) than of women (-0.254 
logarithmic points), and that the incidence of part-time employment is much higher in the case of 
women (27.7% of total employees) than of men (8.7%), as is usual in most advanced economies. 
Table A.2 contains the descriptive statistics for the samples used in the analysis.2 They 
reveal significant differences in observed characteristics of full- and part-time workers in Spain, 
which tend to be in general detrimental for part-time workers’ wages. So, without being 
exhaustive, the comparison between the characteristics of full- and part-time workers reveals that, 
for both genders, the latter have on average lower endowments of education (and of seniority in 
the firm just in the case of females); higher incidence of immigrants and temporary contracts; 
greater presence in occupations associated with lower levels of qualification and in construction 
and, especially, services; and, finally, greater representation in smaller firms and firms covered by 
sectoral agreements (the latter being true only in the case of females). Conversely, part-time 
workers only exhibit better relative endowments of age, and just in the case of males. 
On the other hand, the magnitude of the average wage differential associated with part-
time work exhibits a significant regional heterogeneity, and regional differences in the incidence 
of part-time employment are also rather important (Table 1). Regarding the former, in the case of 
female workers the magnitude of the differential exceeds the national average in regions like 
Andalusia, Extremadura, or Madrid, whereas in others like Navarra or The Rioja the differential 
is notably lower (the maximum and minimum values of the wage differential are -0.315 log points 
for Extremadura and -0.071 for The Rioja, with a standard deviation of 0.071, and all the wage 
differentials estimated for Spanish regions are statistically significant at conventional levels). 
Regional differences are in general also important in the case of male workers (with an extreme 
value of the differential of -0.299 log points for Madrid and a standard deviation of 0.100), 
although in this case wage differentials are not statistically significant for most regions. With 
regard to the incidence of part-time employment, as a matter of example among men the 
percentage of part-time workers in the Canary Islands (11.1%) doubles that of Asturias (5.5%), 
while among women, Navarra (31.4%) is ahead of Madrid (20.8%) by eleven percentage points. 
The results of applying the extension of the Juhn et al. (1993) methodology for the 
decomposition of the differentials in average wages between part-time and full-time workers in 
Spain are shown in Table 2, distinguishing between males (left panel) and females (right panel). 
In particular, the first row of the table shows the value of the raw differential in log hourly wages 
between the two groups of workers, while the rest of the rows show the value of the different terms 
of the decomposition (where a negative value indicates that the factor has a negative effect on the 
relative wages of part-time workers). For each case, we consider four specifications of the wage 
equation (1). The first specification (model 1) includes only explanatory variables related to the 
socio-demographic characteristics of the individuals (i.e. nationality, education and age). The 
second specification (model 2) includes the same individual characteristics along with 
characteristics related to job and firm (seniority, type of contract, region, industry, size and type 
of collective agreement). The third specification (model 3) includes also categorical variables for 
occupation.3 The last specification (model 4) includes firm fixed effects instead of observed firm 
characteristics and thus allows controlling for the effect on wages of unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. The results of models 1 to 3 are equivalent to those that would be obtained from a 
standard decomposition in two components (characteristics and returns) à la Oaxaca-Blinder, 
                                                 
 
 
2 To conserve space, they correspond to the whole samples for the overall Spanish economy. Descriptive statistics of 
the samples for every Spanish region are available from the authors on request. 
3 The reason for separating out this variable in the analysis is that it potentially suffers from endogeneity in relation 
to the distribution of individuals between full- and part-time jobs, to the extent that part-time employment is often 
limited to low-wage occupations (see, eg Manning and Petrongolo, 2008). 
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whereas results from model 4 also include the third component of the right side of the equation 
(3). 
The results of model 1 reveal that when only individual characteristics are considered, the 
lower wage levels of part-time workers cannot be explained by their relative endowments of 
characteristics, but essentially by a different wage treatment. In the case of male workers, the 
component associated with characteristics takes a negligible value of 0.002 log points — not 
significantly different from zero — while most of the origin of the wage differential (-0.104) 
corresponds to the unexplained part (-0.106). In the case of female workers, observed individual 
characteristics explain a relevant part of the differential (-0.104 log points or around 41% of the 
raw gap), but again most of the differential (-0.254) is related to the unexplained part (-0.150). 
Overall, this evidence suggests that when considering just individuals with the same socio-
demographic observed characteristics, the average part-time wage-penalty in the Spanish labour 
market is of -10.6 logarithmic points for males and of -15.0 points for female workers. 
The inclusion of additional explanatory variables related to the characteristics of jobs and firms 
(model 2) substantially increases the contribution of the explained component for both genders. 
In the case of male workers, lower educational levels and seniority, a higher incidence of fixed-
term contracts and a higher presence in low-wage industries arise as relevant explanatory factors 
of the wage disadvantage of part-time male workers, whereas the factor with a more significant 
positive effect for this group is their higher relative age.4 For female workers, the factors 
explaining lower wages of part-time employees are also related to lower endowments of education 
and seniority and higher presence in low-wage industries. Nevertheless, the most remarkable result 
of the evidence obtained from model 2 is that, in contrast with results with model 1, a very 
important part of the wage gap between part-time and full-time workers is now explained: the 
contribution of the explained part of the differential increases to 66% of the raw gap for men and 
to 82% for women. The unexplained part (or wage penalty) is of only -0.036 log points for men 
and -0.046 log points for women, representing 35% and 18% of the total gap, respectively. When 
including also occupation as an explanatory variable (model 3), occupational segregation arises as 
a very relevant explanatory factor of the wage gaps between full- and part-time workers, very 
especially for females5 (this factor alone explains 0.053 log points or 51% of the gap for males 
and 0.116 log points or 46% for females); although the rest of the results are overall rather similar, 
the unexplained components of the decomposition almost halves for both males (-0.016) and 
females (-0.024). These latter values are very different from the wage premium for part-time 
workers previously found for Spain by Cebrián et al. (2000), Pissarides et al. (2005), and Pagán 
(2007) using the ECHP, but are close to the results obtained by O'Dorchai et al. (2007) with the 
1995 SES for men (-0.06 log points), and lower than those obtained by Fernández-Kranz and 
Rodríguez-Planas (2011) and Fernández-Kranz et al. (2014) using the MCVL (between -0.06 and 
-0.13 log points) and a similar set of explanatory factors. It is worth mentioning that the estimated 
penalty according to model 3 (with similar controls to those included in the models summarised 
in figure 1) is very close to the one expected when regressing the wage penalty on the coverage of 
collective bargaining: around 4 percentage points. This result is another sign of the importance of 
this variable to explain cross-country differences in the wage penalty of part-time workers. 
                                                 
 
 
4 This finding is consistent with the fact in Spain a significant part of job contracts among part-time male workers is 
related to partial retirement (Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 2008). 
5 Obtained evidence suggests that the specific contribution to the full-time/part-time wage gap of certain variables 
such as industry and, especially, occupation is much higher in the case of females than in the case of male workers. 
The main reason is that part-time females are significantly segregated into low-wage occupations and industries (Table 
A.2) (Sage: hyperline and print-version inclusion of URL, a finding that is consistent with the fact that occupation 
and industry segregation are very relevant determinants of female relative wages everywhere (see, e.g., Ponthieux 
and Meurs, 2015). 
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The relevance of differences in characteristics as the main explanatory factor of the wage 
differential between part- and full-time workers is reinforced when observed firm level variables 
are replaced by firm fixed effects (model 4). According to this additional evidence, for both 
genders the wage disadvantage of part-time workers is almost fully explained now by their relative 
endowments of individual and job characteristics (the first term of the decomposition explains 
31% of the raw gap for men and 57% for women) and, especially, by their relative segregation in 
low-wage firms (according to the second term the unequal distribution by firms of part- and full-
time workers explains 69% of the gap for men and 42.5% for women). As a consequence, the third 
component associated with the wage residuals has a minimum influence to explain the gap: 
actually, it is not statistically different from zero both for male and female workers. Given that 
this term is an estimation of the average intra-firm wage differential between part- and full-time 
employees with the same characteristics, this last result shows that part- and full-time workers 
who possess the same observed characteristics and who work in the same type of job (including 
occupation) and in the same firm overall tend to receive a similar wage treatment in the Spanish 
labour market (i.e., there is no evidence of direct wage discrimination). This result is consistent 
with the high coverage of collective bargaining in Spain. 
On the other hand, Table 3 shows the results of the Juhn et al. (1993) decomposition of 
average wages between part-time and full-time workers for each of the 17 Spanish regions (the 
upper panel refers to males and the lower panel to females) corresponding to model 4 (i.e. 
including firm fixed-effects). The obtained results show marked differences among regions, 
particularly for female workers. As regards component (1) of the decomposition, differences in 
endowments of observed characteristics are in the case of females systematically unfavourable for 
part-time workers in all considered regions and they are a relevant explanatory factor for the 
negative wage gap for part-time female workers in almost every region, whereas for males the 
first component of the decomposition has positive or negative values depending on the region. As 
regards the effect of the second component, it is observed that both for males and females the 
different relative distribution of full- and part-time workers among firms tends to be a relevant 
explanatory factor of wage differentials in every region (this component is statistically significant 
for most regions, both for males and females). Finally, with a few exceptions, the values of the 
third component are for most Spanish regions not statistically different from zero for both males 
and females, so wage penalties against part-time workers are practically non-existent at regional 
level. Overall, this evidence suggests that in most Spanish regions the bulk of the observed wage 
gap between full- and part-time workers is mainly explained by their different endowments of 
individual, job and firm characteristics and, therefore, that the significant regional heterogeneity 
observed for the Spanish regions in the magnitude of the wage differential between full- and part-
time employees is essentially not explained by regional specific factors. So, the absence of wage 
penalties to part-time workers, even in the presence of such big differences, can probably be 
explained by the wage determination process operating in Spain with a high level of coverage of 
collective agreements in all regions. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This article has examined wage differentials between part- and full-time workers in Spain 
distinguishing by gender. It has contributed to the related literature by introducing a fully novel 
regional perspective into the analysis and by using an econometric decomposition method that 
takes advantage of the use of a matched employer-employee dataset. This technique allows, inter 
alia, estimating intra-firm wage differentials for part- and full-time workers with similar observed 
characteristics as well as the impact in the part-time wage penalty of the segregation of part-time 
workers in low-wage firms. 
The obtained evidence has shown that part-time workers in Spain experience a significant 
average wage disadvantage, and that this disadvantage is significantly higher for female workers. 
 11  
The results of the econometric decompositions have also shown that the wage penalty associated 
with part-time workers, both males and females, is almost fully explained by their relative 
characteristics and, in particular, by the significant segregation of part-time workers in low-wage 
firms. In fact, intra-firm wage differences between full- and part-time workers with similar 
observable productive characteristics working in the same firm are negligible for both genders, 
which suggests a similar wage treatment by Spanish firms of full- and part-time workers; hence, 
the absence of direct wage discrimination against part-time workers — a result that is probably 
related to the high coverage of collective agreements in the Spanish labour market. 
From a regional perspective, in the case of Spain it has been observed that regional 
differences in the incidence of part-time employment are rather significant and that observed wage 
differences between part-time and full-time workers also exhibit a very significant regional 
heterogeneity. The empirical evidence regarding the origin of the wage differential suggests, 
nevertheless, that in the majority of the Spanish region, most of the observed average wage 
differential between part- and full-time workers tends to be explained by worker endowment 
factors so that wage penalties do not usually exist at a regional level. This absence of wage 
penalties for part-time workers supports the hypothesis that a high coverage of wage bargaining 
prevents discriminatory practices against part-time workers, and reinforces the idea that one of the 
major sources of cross-country differences in the wage penalty of part-time workers is differences 
in labour market institutions such as collective bargaining. 
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7. Figures and tables  
 
Figure 1. 
Average unexplained component of wage differentials between part-time and full-time workers and 
coverage of collective bargaining.  
 
 
Country averages of wage penalties found in the literature for male part-time workers with similar 
specifications. Collective bargaining data refers to 2010 and have been obtained from ILOStat. 
  
United States
Canada
United Kingdom
Ireland
Australia
Germany
Greece
NorwayPortugal
Finland
Spain
Italy
Denmark
Netherlands
Sweden
Belgium
France
Austria
-2
0
-1
0
0
1
0
2
0
P
a
rt
-t
im
e
 w
a
g
e
 p
e
n
a
lt
y
20 40 60 80 100
Coverage of collective bargaining
Slope=0.0987 P-value=0.0669 R-squared=0.1536
 15  
 
 
 
Table 1. 
Incidence of part-time work and wage differences between part-time and full-time workers in Spanish 
regions. 
 
Incidence of  
part-time work 
Wage differential 
part-time/full-time 
 Males Females Males Females 
Spain 0.087 0.277 -0.104*** -0.254*** 
Andalusia 0.089 0.296 -0.164*** -0.305*** 
Aragon 0.063 0.261  0.028 -0.146*** 
Asturias 0.054 0.213  0.028 -0.165*** 
Balearic Islands 0.071 0.220 -0.010 -0.192*** 
Canary Islands 0.111 0.231 -0.139*** -0.268*** 
Cantabria 0.058 0.233  0.050 -0.230*** 
Castilla-Leon 0.061 0.252 -0.016 -0.246*** 
Castilla La Mancha 0.064 0.279 -0.032 -0.269*** 
Catalonia 0.079 0.235 -0.151*** -0.247*** 
Valencia 0.099 0.306 -0.138*** -0.209*** 
Extremadura 0.069 0.273 -0.098** -0.315*** 
Galicia 0.067 0.226  0.045 -0.192*** 
Madrid 0.073 0.208 -0.299*** -0.314*** 
Murcia 0.090 0.286 -0.125*** -0.271*** 
Navarre 0.063 0.314  0.049 -0.071*** 
Basque Country 0.058 0.306  0.037 -0.227*** 
The Rioja 0.068 0.290 -0.083* -0.100*** 
Unweighted average 0.073 0.261 -0.060     -0.222 
Regional standard deviation 0.016 0.036   0.100 0.071 
Maximum 0.111 0.314   0.050     -0.071 
Minimum 0.054 0.208 -0.299     -0.315 
Notes: The incidence of part-time work is measured over total employees whereas the wage gap corresponds to the differential 
of the logarithm of the hourly wage between part- and full-time workers. Average unemployment rates for 2010 have been 
obtained from the Labour Force Survey. 
* p<0,1; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
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Table 2.  
Decomposition of the differential in average wages between part- and full-time workers. 
Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition. 
 Males    Females    
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Wage differential  -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.104***  -0.104*** -0.254*** -0.254*** -0.254*** -0.254*** 
Characteristics (1) 
0.002(-2.0) -
0.069(66.3)*** -0.088***(84.6) 
-
0.032***(30.8) 
-
0.104***(40.9) 
-
0.208(81.9***) -0.229***(90.2) -0.144(56.7) 
Nationality -0.003***  -0.001***  -0.001***  0.000 -0.002***  0.000  0.000  0.001 
Educational attainment -0.026*** -0.022*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.104*** -0.088*** -0.030*** -0.052*** 
Age  0.031***  0.014***  0.011***  0.010***  0.001  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Tenure - -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.014*** - -0.048*** -0.039*** -0.031*** 
Type of contract - -0.016*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -  0.000  0.000 0.000 
Occupation - - -0.053*** -0.012*** - - -0.116*** -0.062*** 
Region -  0.007***  0.006*** - - -0.005*** -0.002*** - 
Industry of activity - -0.040*** -0.029*** - - -0.052*** -0.029*** - 
Firm size -  0.003***  0.003*** - - -0.006*** -0.006*** - 
Collective agreement -  0.003***  0.002*** - - -0.010*** -0.006*** - 
Firm fixed effects (2) - 
- - 
-
0.072***(69.2) 
- 
- - 
-
0.108***(42.5) 
Wage residuals (3) 
-
0.106***(102.0) 
-
0.036(34.6)*** 
-0.016***(15.4) 0.000(0.0) 
-
0.150(59.1***) 
-
0.046(18.1)*** 
-0.024***(9.8) -0.002(0.8) 
Number of observations 89,334 89,334 89,334 89,334 62,755 62,755 62,755 62,755 
Notes: The table shows the results obtained after applying equation (3) to the 2010 wave of the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial. Model 1 corresponds to a specification of the wage equation that includes individual characteristics 
(nationality, age and education); models 2 and 3 incorporate to the specification attributes of jobs and firms (tenure, type of contract, occupation, region, sector, size and type of collective agreement), whereas model 4 includes 
individual and job attributes and firm fixed effects instead of firm attributes. The percentage of the wage differential explained by each term appears in brackets. 
* p<0,1; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
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Table 3.  
Decomposition of the differential in average wages between part- and full-time workers. 
Juhn-Murphy-Pierce decomposition. Regional disaggregated analysis.  
  Wage 
differential 
Characteristics (1) 
Firm fixed 
effects (2) 
Wage 
residuals (3) 
Number 
of observ. 
Males       
Andalusia  -0.164*** -0.041** -0.123*** -0.002 8,973 
Aragon  0.028 0.075*** -0.062*** 0.015 3,747 
Asturias  0.028 0.030 -0.019*** 0.017 2,971 
Balearic Islands  -0.010 -0.011 -0.005 0.006 2,316 
Canary Islands  -0.139*** -0.035** -0.109*** 0.005 3,69 
Cantabria  0.050 0.056*** -0.033*** 0.026 2,385 
Castilla-Leon  -0.016 0.020 -0.054*** 0.017 4,781 
Castilla La Mancha  -0.032 0.021 -0.029*** -0.024 3,68 
Catalonia  -0.151*** -0.074*** -0.084*** 0.006 14,763 
Valencia  -0.138*** -0.014 -0.114*** -0.009 7,389 
Extremadura  -0.098** -0.019 -0.075*** -0.004 2,042 
Galicia  0.045 0.000 0.005 0.039*** 4,803 
Madrid  -0.299*** -0.141*** -0.125*** -0.034** 15,32 
Murcia  -0.125*** -0.041* -0.091*** 0.007 2,764 
Navarre  0.049 0.002 -0.017 0.064*** 2,635 
Basque Country  0.037 0.007 -0.007 0.036** 5,69 
The Rioja  -0.083 -0.008 -0.050*** -0.026 1,395 
Females       
Andalusia  -0.305*** -0.149*** -0.156*** -0.002 5,975 
Aragon  -0.146*** -0.119*** -0.059*** 0.032** 2,345 
Asturias  -0.165*** -0.151*** -0.021 0.007 1,561 
Balearic Islands  -0.192*** -0.121*** -0.064*** -0.007 1,807 
Canary Islands  -0.268*** -0.142*** -0.151*** 0.025 2,685 
Cantabria  -0.230*** -0.119*** -0.104*** -0.008 1,229 
Castilla-Leon  -0.246*** -0.124*** -0.123*** -0.001 3,117 
Castilla La Mancha  -0.269*** -0.133*** -0.137*** 0.002 2,166 
Catalonia  -0.247*** -0.139*** -0.096*** -0.012 12,362 
Valencia  -0.209*** -0.125*** -0.086*** 0.002 4,83 
Extremadura  -0.315*** -0.155*** -0.155*** -0.005 1,063 
Galicia  -0.192*** -0.123*** -0.087*** 0.018 3,505 
Madrid  -0.314*** -0.179*** -0.121*** -0.014 13,062 
Murcia  -0.271*** -0.139*** -0.130*** -0.002 1,634 
Navarre  -0.071*** -0.097*** -0.007 0.033** 1,265 
Basque Country  -0.227*** -0.147*** -0.079*** -0.001 3,392 
The Rioja  -0.100*** -0.112*** 0.005 0.008 757 
Notes: The table shows the results obtained after applying equation (3) to the 2010 wave of the Encuesta de Estructura 
Salarial with a specification of the wage equation that includes individual and job characteristics and firm fixed effects 
(model 4).* p<0,1; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
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Table A.1. Recent studies about part-time versus full-time wage differences  
Authors  Country  Years  Databases  Samples/Gender  Sample/Age Part-time wage 
penalty 
Control 
occupations  
Control self-selection Firm Fixed 
Effects  
O’Connell and Gash 
(2003) 
Ireland 1994 ECHP Men and Women  17 and more M    0% 
W  -9% * 
M   0% 
W  0% 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Hu and Tijdens (2003) Netherland and  
Unites Kingdom 
1984-88 ECHP Men +Women 
together 
15-65 Neth.   -11%* 
UK     -3%* 
Yes Ordered Probit  No 
Rodgers (2004) Australia 2001 HILDA 
(households) 
Men and Women ... M    -3 p. log. 
W   -9 p. log. 
Yes Multinomial Logit No 
Hirsch (2005) USA 1995-2002 Census 
Population 
Survey 
Men and Women  16 and more M   -33 p. log.* 
W  -18 p. log.* 
M   -22 p. log.* 
W  -10 p. log.* 
M  +19 p. log.* 
W +15 p. log.* 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
FE individual 
FE individual 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Jepsen et al (2005) Belgium 1995 SES (firms) Women ...    -4 p. log.* 
  +1 p. log. 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Pissarides et al (2005) United Kingdom 
Finland 
Denmark 
Germany  
Netherland 
Belgium 
Austria 
Ireland 
France 
Italy 
Spain 
Portugal 
Greece 
1994-99 ECHP Men and Women  16-61 UK M -20 p. log.* 
      W -12 p. log.* 
FINL M -9 p. log.* 
         W  -2p. log. 
DEN M -15 p. log.* 
          W-6 p. log.* 
GERM  M 0p. log. 
            W -10 p. log.* 
NET  M -11 p. log.* 
          W  -4 p. log.* 
BELG  M -6 p. log. 
            W  +3 p. log. 
AUS  M -12 p. log.* 
          W  +6 p. log.* 
IREL  M -12 p. log.* 
         W-8 p. log.* 
FRA   M 0 p. log. 
          W  +4 p. log.* 
ITAL M +15 p. log.* 
          W +16 p. log.* 
SPA  M +6 p. log.* 
         W +19 p. log.* 
PORT M 0 p. log. 
           W -4 p. log.* 
GRE M +12 p. log.* 
          W +14 p. log.* 
Yes No (1) No 
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Table A.1. Recent studies about part-time versus full-time wage differences (cont’) 
Authors  Country  Years  Databases  Samples/Gender  Sample/Age Part-time wage 
penalty 
Control 
occupations  
Control self-selection Firm Fixed 
Effects  
Hardoy and Schone 
(2006) 
Norway 1997-98 LLS (households) Women (only 
voluntary PT) 
20-60     - 0,5% 
   -10,9%* 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Probit 
No 
No 
O’Dorchai et al (2007) Belgium 
Denmark 
Italy 
Spain 
Ireland 
United Kingdom 
1995 SES (firms) Men ... BEL    -7 p. log.* 
DEN   +1 p. log. 
ITA   -13 p. log.* 
SPA    -6 p. log.* 
IREL    -29 p. log.* 
U K   -15 p. log.* 
Yes No No 
Posel and Muller (2007) South Africa 2001-2004 LFS (households) Men ...   + 34% * 
  + 40% * 
  + 50% * 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Individual FE 
No 
No 
No 
Pagán (2007) Spain  2000 ECHP Men and Women  16-64 M  +6 p. log.* 
W +14 p. log.* 
Yes Ordered Probit  No 
Russo and Massik (2008) Netherland  1997-98 
and 1999-
2000 
WCS (firms) Men and Women 
which do not 
change company 
... M    - 3%* 
W   - 1% * 
Yesi No No 
Manning and Petrongolo 
(2008) 
United Kingdom 2001-03 LFS (households) Women  16-64   -11 p. log.* 
  - 3 p. log.* 
 -11 p. log.* 
 - 2 p. log. * 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Probit 
Probit 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Mumford and Smith 
(2008) 
United Kingdom 2004 BWERS (firms) Men and Women ... M      0 p. log. 
W  -11 p. log.* 
M    +5 p. log.* 
W    -3 p. log.* 
M     +1 p. log.* 
W    -8 p. log.* 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Bardasi and Gornick 
(2008) 
Canada 
USA 
United Kingdom 
Germany  
Italy 
Sweden 
1994-1995 Luxembourg 
Income Study 
Women 25-59 CAN    -9 p. log.* 
USA   -17 p. log.* 
UK       -1 p. log. 
GER    -8 p. log.* 
ITA    -15 p. log.* 
SWE    -3 p. log.* 
Yes Yes No 
Boot and Wood (2008) Australia 2001-04 HILDA 
(households) 
Men and Women 18-60 M Casual    +10%* 
M No Cas  +15%* 
W Casual  + 15%* 
W No Cas + 10%* 
Yes Individual FE No 
Connelly and Gregory 
(2009) 
United Kingdom 1975-2001 New Earnings 
Survey 
Women  16 and more    -10 p. log.* 
    -2 p. log.* 
    -7 p. log.* 
  -32 p. log.* 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Individual FE 
Individual FE 
Movers FE 
Movers FE 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Fernández-Kranz and 
Rodríguez-Planas (2011) 
Spain  1996-2006 MCVL Women 25-45   -19 p. log.* 
  -17 p. log.* 
  -13 p. log.* 
   -11 p. log.* 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Individual FE 
Individual FE 
Individual FE 
Individual FE 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
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Table A.1. Recent studies about part-time versus full-time wage differences (cont’) 
Authors  Country  Years  Databases  Samples/Gender  Sample/Age Part-time wage 
penalty 
Control 
occupations  
Control self-selection Firm Fixed 
Effects  
Fernández-Kranz, Paul 
and Rodríguez-Planas 
(2014) 
Spain  1996-2006 MCVL Women  23-45 Permanent Contract  
     -6 p. log.* 
Temporary Contract 
      -9 p. log.* 
No (2) Multiequational Model 
and Probit 
Yes 
Wolf (2014) Germany  
(East and West) 
1984-2010 SOEP 
(households) 
Men and Women  20-60 West M -12%* 
         M -11%* 
         W 0% 
         W +1% 
East  M  -11%* 
          M  -10%* 
          W +1% 
          W +2% 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Individual FE No 
Preston and Yu (2015) Australia 2010 AWS 
(households) 
Men and Women ...   M  -8,9 p.log* 
  W  -1,1 p. log* 
W  Casual +7,1%* 
Yes No No 
* Statistically significant at the usual levels (1% or 5%, depending on each paper). 
(1) According to the authors, results are robust to controlling for self selection by a probit model or by individual fixed effect when they work with the sample of movers from full-time to part-time. 
(2) Authors explain that they introduced additional controls (occupations and more) and results did not change. 
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Table A.2. Descriptive statistics.  
 Males Females 
 Full-time Part-time Full-time Part-time 
 Average SD Average SD Average SD Average SD 
Logarithm of hourly wage 2.423 0.494 2.318 0.591 2.282 0.481 2.028 0.400 
Immigrant 0.065 0.247 0.093 0.297 0.051 0.222 0.080 0.271 
Primary education  0.183 0.387 0.233 0.423 0.102 0.303 0.200 0.400 
Secondary education  0.598 0.490 0.585 0.493 0.542 0.498 0.637 0.481 
Tertiary education  0.219 0.414 0.181 0.385 0.356 0.479 0.163 0.369 
Age 40.640 10.150 42.740 14.830 39.080 9.826 39.200 10.920 
Tenure 9.351 9.676 9.877 13.410 8.320 9.059 5.114 6.623 
Fixed-term contract 0.811 0.391 0.444 0.497 0.800 0.400 0.666 0.472 
Unskilled occupations 0.089 0.285 0.162 0.368 0.089 0.285 0.297 0.457 
Semi-skilled occupations 0.478 0.499 0.435 0.495 0.277 0.447 0.362 0.481 
Skilled occupations 0.432 0.445 0.402 0.490 0.634 0.482 0.341 0.474 
Andalusia 0.099 0.299 0.111 0.314 0.080 0.272 0.134 0.341 
Aragon 0.042 0.201 0.038 0.191 0.038 0.191 0.036 0.186 
Asturias 0.034 0.181 0.028 0.164 0.025 0.156 0.025 0.155 
Balearics 0.023 0.151 0.052 0.223 0.026 0.158 0.037 0.189 
Canary Islands 0.042 0.201 0.033 0.179 0.044 0.205 0.040 0.196 
Cantabria 0.027 0.161 0.026 0.158 0.018 0.135 0.023 0.149 
Castilla-Leon 0.054 0.227 0.045 0.208 0.048 0.213 0.055 0.228 
Castilla La Mancha 0.042 0.201 0.032 0.176 0.037 0.188 0.029 0.167 
Catalonia 0.163 0.369 0.187 0.390 0.201 0.401 0.187 0.390 
Valencia 0.083 0.275 0.084 0.278 0.076 0.265 0.080 0.271 
Extremadura 0.024 0.151 0.017 0.127 0.016 0.125 0.020 0.139 
Galicia 0.055 0.228 0.040 0.196 0.059 0.236 0.047 0.211 
Madrid 0.171 0.377 0.172 0.377 0.223 0.416 0.170 0.376 
Murcia 0.031 0.174 0.026 0.159 0.026 0.158 0.027 0.163 
Navarre 0.030 0.169 0.029 0.166 0.020 0.141 0.020 0.139 
Basque Country 0.063 0.243 0.068 0.252 0.052 0.222 0.060 0.237 
The Rioja 0.016 0.125 0.012 0.109 0.012 0.108 0.013 0.111 
Industry 0.424 0.494 0.288 0.453 0.220 0.414 0.093 0.291 
Construction 0.122 0.327 0.037 0.188 0.014 0.117 0.005 0.073 
Services 0.454 0.498 0.675 0.468 0.766 0.423 0.902 0.298 
Firm size less than 10 0.105 0.307 0.138 0.345 0.085 0.280 0.123 0.329 
Firm size 10-49 0.238 0.426 0.195 0.396 0.171 0.377 0.153 0.360 
Firm size 50-199 0.277 0.447 0.226 0.418 0.218 0.413 0.235 0.424 
Firm size 500 or more 0.380 0.485 0.441 0.497 0.525 0.499 0.489 0.500 
National sectoral collective agreement 0.286 0.452 0.282 0.450 0.349 0.477 0.304 0.460 
Sub-national sectoral collective agreement 0.416 0.493 0.388 0.487 0.303 0.460 0.458 0.498 
Firm collective agreement 0.299 0.458 0.329 0.470 0.348 0.476 0.238 0.426 
Number of observations 81,578 7,766 45,338 17,417 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
